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Abstract 
 According to recent theoretical proposals, one function of infant goal attribution is to 
support early social learning of artifact functions from instrumental actions, and one function 
of infant sensitivity to communication is to support early acquisition of generic knowledge 
about enduring, kind-relevant properties of the referents. The present study tested two 
hypotheses, derived from these proposals, about the conditions that facilitate the acquisition 
of enduring functions for novel tools in human infancy. Using a violation-of-expectation 
paradigm, we show that 13.5-months-old infants encode arbitrary end-states of action-
sequences in relation to the novel tools employed to bring them about. These mappings are 
not formed if the same end states of action sequences cannot be interpreted as action goals. 
Moreover, the tool-goal mappings acquired from infant-directed communicative 
demonstrations are more resilient to counter-evidence than those acquired from non-infant-
directed presentations, and thus show similarities to generic rather than episodic 
representations. These findings suggest that the acquisition of tool functions in infancy is 
guided by both teleological action interpretation mechanisms and the expectation that 
communicative demonstrations reveal enduring dispositional properties of tools. 
 Keywords: infancy, tool function, goal, teleological action interpretation, 
communication, ostension 
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Infants learn enduring functions of novel tools from action demonstrations 
Introduction 
The material culture of Homo sapiens displays robustness and complexity unmatched 
in the animal kingdom. Our environment is populated with artifacts, and our goals are 
routinely attained with the help of different kinds of tools, which were designed and 
manufactured in order to facilitate bringing these goals about. Human adults conceptualize 
tools through their functions, i.e., they tend to think about kinds of tools as being “for” 
achieving particular goals. Function is an enduring dispositional property of a tool to bring 
about a particular goal when used in an instrumental action. Consequently, function is an 
unobservable abstract feature, whose relations to the available structural and behavioral 
information (e.g., observable physical features of a tool or its manners of use) are often 
cognitively opaque (Csibra & Gergely, 2006). Human children deal remarkably well with the 
considerable and unique challenge of acquiring knowledge of tool-kinds in terms of their 
functions, and numerous attempts have been made recently to study experimentally the early 
developmental roots of these achievements in infancy (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011; 
Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007; Futó, Téglás, Csibra, & Gergely, 2010; 
Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Sommerville, Hildebrand, & Crane, 2008; Träuble & Pauen, 
2007). 
Learning tool functions is not just a necessary step in development of full-fledged 
adult-like tool-use, but also a key to categorization of artifacts (Kelemen & Carey, 2007) — 
i.e., of a substantial portion of the human environment — as well as a key to online 
prediction of instrumental actions with tools and of their outcomes (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; 
Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Paulus, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2011) – i.e. of a substantial 
portion of human everyday activities. Thus, we can expect that the development of functional 
knowledge of tools is not necessarily tied to slowly emerging competencies to use tools 
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(Greif & Needham, 2011; McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 2001), and may have very early 
developmental bases. In adults, (i) function underlies categorization of tools (i.e. any given 
tool belongs to a kind in virtue of function, which is a property of both the individual tool and 
of its kind), (ii) tool-function mappings are exclusive (i.e., typically a tool has a single kind-
defining function even though its physical structure affords attaining various goals), and (iii) 
tool-function mappings are enduring (i.e., a tool maintains its kind-defining function when 
broken, not in use, or when temporarily put to a different idiosyncratic use). Recent studies 
have demonstrated attention to functional information for categorization of tools in 12-
months-old infants (Träuble & Pauen, 2007), expectation of exclusive mappings between 
artifacts and their hidden dispositional properties in infants perhaps as young as 10-month-
old (Futó et al, 2010, but see Casler, 2014; Defeyter & German, 2003), and beginnings of 
endurance of function-tool mappings in 24-month-olds (Casler & Kelemen, 2007). 
In order to learn the function of a tool one can try finding out what it was made for. 
Even young preschoolers appreciate the importance of intended function when making 
functional judgments (Kelemen, 1999; Defeyter, Hearing, & German, 2009). However, since 
both designers and users of tools typically aim at maximizing efficiency of instrumental 
actions, function can be often reliably established by considering what the tool is good for 
(i.e., it can be inferred from the causal-mechanical affordances of the tool), or by observing 
what it is used for (i.e., it can be inferred from the goal of an observed instrumental action 
with the tool; Csibra & Gergely, 2007). The latter route to function-tool mappings is of 
particular interest here for three reasons: (i) It relies on the mechanisms of action 
understanding, which can support goal-attribution (and consequently ascription of the 
function to the tool) despite the cognitive opacity of the causal relations that underlie the 
workings of the tool and its manner of use. (ii) Given human infants’ proficiency with goal-
attribution, learning what the tool is for by observing what it is used for may be a cognitive 
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strategy available to human children already in infancy. (iii) Identifying the goal of an 
instrumental tool-use demonstrated in a communicative context, may allow infants to infer 
not only the idiosyncratic purpose that the individual tool serves on a particular occasion but 
its enduring function, which for adults defines the tool-kind (Hernik & Csibra, 2009). 
The series of experiments presented in this paper explores the conditions that 
facilitate the acquisition of enduring functions for novel tools in human infancy. Specifically, 
this research is motivated by the theoretical proposal that learning tool kinds and their 
functions is facilitated by two sets of cognitive skills: (i) the propensity for teleological action 
interpretation, and (ii) the ability to acquire generic information from ostensive 
communicative demonstrations. In the following sections we discuss these theoretical claims 
in detail. 
Early teleological action interpretation and tool-function acquisition. Throughout 
this paper we use the term “goal” to refer to a state of reality that is interpreted as an 
explanatory factor for the action that has brought it about. Such interpretations of action-
outcome relations are called “teleological” (Csibra & Gergely, 2013). 
From very early on, human infants are prone to interpret observed behaviors as goal-
directed actions. This claim is supported by at least 3 types of evidence. (i) Infants expect 
observed consecutive actions to be similar with respect to their end-states (e.g. a hand ending 
its movement by making contact with a particular toy, or an agent stopping at a particular 
object) rather than with respect to their spatiotemporal characteristics (e.g. a hand or an agent 
moving towards the object along a particular motion-path; Woodward, 1998). (ii) This 
preferential encoding of the end-states over the spatiotemporal characteristics of the means 
actions depends critically on the behavioral and contextual characteristics of the actions 
leading to these end-states, such as efficiency (Hernik & Southgate, 2012, Biro, Verschoor, & 
Coenen, 2011), selectivity (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Hernik & Southgate, 2012) and 
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purposefulness (Woodward 1999). (iii) Infants expect observed consecutive actions towards 
the same end-state to change according to the changing environment and to be the most 
efficient given the current situational constraints, rather than to preserve familiar 
spatiotemporal characteristics (Csibra & Gergely, 2013). Recent studies suggest that infants 
are sensitive to such efficiency considerations within the first months of their lives (Csibra 
2008; Skerry, Carey, & Spelke 2013). It is worth pointing out that many recent studies on 
goal-attribution in infancy employ fixed-length familiarization paradigms, in which goals are 
operationalized as visually perceivable end-states of action sequences (e.g. Biro et al, 2011; 
Hernik & Southgate 2012, Luo, 2011; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005) 
One potential function of the early emerging capacity for teleological action 
interpretation may be to support early social learning of tool functions despite cognitive 
opacity of tools (Casler & Kelemen, 2005, Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Hernik & Csibra, 2009). 
If human infants’ representations of tools, like those of human adults, are indeed function-
centered and facilitated by teleological interpretation of instrumental actions with tools, we 
should expect infants to readily form specific mappings between novel tools and goals, even 
if they cannot be supported by additional elements of tool knowledge (e.g., the understanding 
how the tool’s structure and manner of use contribute causally to the goal). When tools of 
two different kinds are operated by means of the same actions (e.g., a flashlight and a remote 
control — both hand-held and operated by button-pushing), teleological interpretation of 
these actions should nevertheless enable ascribing two different functions to the tools, 
provided that there are two distinct states of environment (e.g., the light being emitted vs. the 
TV being on), which can be attributed as goals to the respective actions with these tools. 
Notably, it is not yet established whether infants are capable of such achievements. 
Firstly, sensitivity to function in infants is typically operationalized by assessing whether they 
encode distinctive correlates of tool function: tool parts, means actions or spatial locations of 
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the goal (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Paulus et al., 2011; Träuble & Pauen, 2007). 
Secondly, even though recent findings are taken to suggest that, by the end of their first year 
of life, infants can form distinctive tool-outcome mappings, the underlying mechanism is 
unclear. Baumgartner and Oakes (2011) habituated infants to videos showing two different 
toys acted upon in the same way (e.g., rolled across a screen) while two different sounds 
(e.g., click or whistle) were emitted. Subsequently, 12-month-olds, but not younger infants, 
reacted with increased looking to test events in which the toy-sound pairings were switched, 
thus displaying evidence of learning separate correlations between the two toys and the 
corresponding sounds (see also Perone & Oakes, 2006, review in Oakes & Madole, 2008). 
While these results are consistent with our hypothesis, they do not clarify whether the toy-
sound mappings relied on teleological action representation or were produced by processes of 
audio-visual integration and detection of co-occurrences within such bimodal events (for 
discussions, see Horst, Oakes, & Madole, 2005; Oakes & Madole, 2008)1. Extensive 
habituation procedure and reliance on auditory stimuli makes it difficult to compare 
Baumgartner & Oakes’ (2011) study with the literature on teleological action interpretation. 
We designed a violation-of-expectations procedure based on visual stimuli, which 
allowed us to target infants’ mappings of tools and states of the environment. In Experiment 
                                                
1 According to Oakes and colleagues (Perone, Madole, & Oakes, 2011), temporal contiguity 
of sound and action on the toy might lead infants to interpret the former as the causal 
consequence of the latter, but this conjecture was not tested experimentally (e.g., by 
manipulating temporal order of the action and the sound). This issue is not crucial for the 
approach advocated by Madole, Oakes and colleagues (Madole & Cohen, 1995; Oakes & 
Madole, 2008), which focuses on detecting co-occurrences of features (in this case, 
appearances and sounds) as a general mechanism underlying function acquisition in infancy. 
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1, we asked whether infants would form representations linking two different novel tools 
with the end-states of action sequences in which they were used. Notably, the stimuli were 
design in order to ensure that the separate mappings could not be supported by attention to 
distinctive correlates of function. The tools were operated in the same manner and applied to 
the same location. They had no distinctive parts active when the goal was produced and the 
physical features provided no obvious cues to functions. Experiment 2 was designed to rule 
out that end-states of actions enter these representations in virtue of mere visual co-
occurrence with the tools. 
Acquiring generic tool representations from communicative demonstrations. 
Numerous recent empirical findings suggest that communicative demonstrations facilitate the 
encoding of kind-relevant and generalizable information in human children and infants 
(Träuble & Bätz, 2014; Egyed, Király, & Gergely, 2013; Király, Csibra, & Gergely, 2013; 
Butler & Markman, 2012, 2014; Futó at al., 2010; Yoon et al., 2008). According to the 
theoretical proposal of natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011; Csibra & 
Shamsudheen, in press) ostensive communication has this effect by eliciting a referential 
expectation (i.e., an expectation that the demonstration has a content; Deligianni, Senju, 
Gergely, & Csibra, 2011; Senju & Csibra, 2009) and a ‘genericity bias’ towards the content 
of the demonstration. In case of tool-function demonstrations genericity bias may lead to an 
expectation that the predicate (i.e., the demonstrated function) applies not only to the current 
episode but rather that it represents a permanent property of the object, and that it applies not 
only to the particular object used in the demonstration, but also to the kind that this object 
represents. On this account, communicative demonstrations of tool use are interpreted by the 
addressee as providing explicit information about the enduring, culturally sanctioned function 
of the object kind represented by the particular tool used in the demonstration. In contrast, 
while the mere observation of the outcome of a goal-directed tool-use may provide a cue 
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about the potential function of the tool, the observed action could well be an idiosyncratic use 
of the object, whose outcome is not be to learned or generalized to other objects or to other 
occasions. 
We addressed the role of the communicative context in forming the tool-goal 
mappings in Experiments 3 and 4, and tested the hypothesis that communicative 
demonstrations enable acquisition of generic functional representation of novel tools. 
Experiment 1 
We designed a violation-of-expectations procedure in which infants first watched two 
novel tools (a ‘banana-peeler’ and a ‘banana-healer’), the use of which led to two different 
end-states. For an adult viewer, one of the tools seemed to transform an unpeeled banana into 
a peeled one, the other seemed to transform a peeled banana into an unpeeled one. In order to 
assess whether infants learned the mappings between each novel tool and its respective end-
state, we measured 13.5-month-old2 infants’ looking-times to test events in which the use of 
                                                
2 This age group was chosen for two reasons. First, it has been argued that 14-month-olds 
acquire function-form mappings through detecting arbitrary visual correlations (Madole & 
Cohen, 1995), making this age-group particularly suitable for testing the role of teleological 
action interpretation in functional encoding of tools. Second, in a pilot study with sixteen 12-
month-olds (11 months and 21 days – 12 months and 16 days; mean = 12 months), which 
used a procedure and design identical to Experiment 1 (except that each participants saw only 
2, rather than 4 test trials), we found no statistically significant effect of Test Event, 
meanCongruent = 19.49 s, SDCongruent = 15.77, meanIncongruent = 14.59 s, SDIncongruent = 14.59, t(15) 
= 1.51, p = 0.15, 2-tailed. We did find, however, a significant correlation between the index 
of looking to incongruent rather than congruent event (looking-timeInongruent - looking-
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the banana-peeler and the banana-healer led to end-states that were either congruent or 
incongruent with these mappings. 
 Since previous studies demonstrated that the presence of ostensive communicative 
signals, such as infant-directed speech, facilitates the encoding of kind-relevant information 
about artifacts (Futó at al., 2010; see also Yoon, et al., 2008), we also embedded our function 
demonstrations within the context of infant-directed communication. 
Methods 
Participants. Sixteen 13.5-months-old infants (13 months and 3 days – 14 months 2 
days; mean  =  13 months and 19 days) constituted the final sample. Two additional babies 
were excluded and replaced because they did not finish the procedure due to fussiness. All 
included babies looked at the outcome phase of each test trial for a minimum of 2 s (see 
Procedure and stimuli section for details). 
Procedure and stimuli. Infants sat on their parents’ lap approximately 100 cm away 
from the presentation screen, and watched a series of 8 familiarization trials followed by 4 
test trials. An attention-getting animation was presented before 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th 
familiarization trial and before each test trial. After the 8th familiarization trial, a message on 
the screen reminded the parents to keep their eyes closed till the end of the session. 
 Stimuli were movies pre-edited in Final Cut Express 4.0 software and presented on a 
40 inch (102 cm) plasma screen, so that all depicted objects were shown in their real-life size 
(see Figure 1). Each familiarization movie (11.75 s total running time) started by fading-in 
from black (0.5 s) into a picture of a black-clothed table against a black background, with a 
banana mounted in the middle and a pair of novel objects (each approximately 15 cm wide 
                                                                                                                                                  
timeCongruent) and age, rPearson(16) = .66. p = .005, which suggested to us that the task may be 
more suitable for babies older than 12 months. 
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and 26 cm high; henceforth: a Blue and a Pink tool) standing on each side, 48 cm apart. Both 
tools were in fact flower-pots turned upside down: a blue ceramic one and a pink plastic one 
with a semi-translucent plastic vertical tube attached on top. After a pause of 2.75 s, a pair of 
female human hands entered the scene from one of the sides. The hands lifted the nearest 
tool, covered the banana with it (2 s), then rotated the tool around its vertical axis by 45 
degrees and back (1.25 s). Finally, the hands lifted the tool up from the banana, put it back to 
its original position at the side of the screen and exited (2.75 s). The outcome stayed on the 
screen for 2 s, and then the picture faded-out to black (0.5 s). 
 
Figure 1. Still frames from two exemplars of familiarization movies used in Experiments 1, 3 
& 4. In Experiment 2, the final state of the banana in each familiarization movie was identical 
to its initial state. The movies used in test trials never showed the initial state of the banana. 
 
Crucially, if at the start of the familiarization movie the banana was unpeeled, then it 
was revealed as peeled when the tool was lifted back from it (banana-peeling movies), and if 
the banana was initially peeled, it was revealed unpeeled (banana-healing movies). Each 
infant saw 4 peeling and 4 healing movies on alternate familiarization trials, with one of the 
tools (either the Pink or the Blue, fully counterbalanced across participants) being 
consistently used as the banana-peeler and the other used as the banana-healer. 
The 1st familiarization movie always showed the tool on the left being operated, but 
whether this tool was Pink or Blue was fully counterbalanced across participants. The 1st, 
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2nd, 5th and 6th familiarization trials showed the tools in the same spatial arrangement (e.g. 
the Pink on the left and Blue on the right) and the 3rd, 4th, 7th and 8th in the opposite spatial 
arrangement. 
Each familiarization movie had the same pre-recorded audio track in which a female 
voice speaking Hungarian with infant-directed prosody (Cooper & Aslin, 1990). The voice 
said “Hello baby, hello. I will show you something. Look! See? Done.” The voice belonged 
to the research assistant who talked to the mother and the baby for about 5-10 minutes prior 
to the experiment, then walked with them to the testing room, seated them in front of the 
presentation screen and hid behind the curtain at the back of the presentation screen. Thus, 
the audio track carried three potential indicators (the prosody, the verbal content, and the 
speaker with a recent history of interactions) that could lead infants to interpret the 
familiarization movies as communicative demonstrations ostensively directed to them. 
During the test trials, infants saw movies just like those presented during 
familiarization, except that they were silent and began with the banana already covered and 
the hands starting to twist the tool around it. Thus, the initial state of the banana (peeled or 
unpeeled) was not known. Each test trial consisted of an action phase and an outcome phase. 
The action phase was always 2800 ms long and lasted from the beginning of the movie till 
the first movie-frame in which the banana was fully visible. The rest of the trial was the 
outcome phase, during which the hands brought the tool back to its side and exited, and the 
still frame of the two tools and the banana stayed on the screen until the infant looked away 
from the screen for more than 2 s, according to the on-line coding, or until 60 s elapsed from 
the beginning of the trial. 
For each infant, on two test trials (either 1st and 4th or 2nd and 3rd, fully 
counterbalanced across the participants) the outcomes were congruent with the tool-end-state 
mapping presented in familiarization (i.e., the banana revealed from under the banana-peeler 
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was peeled or the one revealed from under the banana-healer was unpeeled), and on the 
remaining two trials they were incongruent (i.e., the banana revealed from under the banana-
healer was peeled or the one revealed from under the banana-peeler was unpeeled). The Pink 
tool was used on the 1st and 3rd trial and the Blue tool was used on the 2nd and 4th trial. 
Thus, within each pair of test trials (1st vs. 2nd), each tool was shown producing the same 
outcome, but one trial was always congruent and one was incongruent. For all infants, all test 
trials showed the same spatial arrangements of the tools: the Blue tool was operated from the 
left side and the Pink tool from the right. 
Measure and coding. Infants were video recorded at 25 frames per second for off-
line coding by the first author. The main measure of interest was infants’ looking-time 
towards the screen during test trials from the beginning of the outcome phase till the infant 
looked away from the screen for more than 2 s (according to the off-line coding), or till the 
end of the test trial. Test trials from 6 infants (37% of all test trials) were coded off-line by a 
second coder, blinded to the conditions. The inter-coder agreement was excellent (r  =  .99, 
average absolute difference per trial  =  112 ms). For all parametric tests, the looking times to 
the outcome phases of test trials were log-transformed in order to approximate a normal 
distribution. 
Results and Discussion 
Infants attended very well to the familiarization events. On average, a familiarization 
trial was watched for 97% of its duration (minimum = 71%, maximum = 100%), with 83% of 
all familiarization trials watched for at least 95% of their duration. All infants looked towards 
the screen 100% of the time during the action phases of test trials. 
Average looking times to the test events are depicted on Figure 2. An initial 2 (Test 
Pair: 1st vs. 2nd) x 2 (Test Event: Congruent vs. Incongruent) ANOVA on log-transformed 
looking-times to the outcome-phases of test trials showed only a main effect of Test Event, 
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F(1,15) = 6.72, p = .02, !p2 = .31. There was no significant effect of Test Pair, F(1,15) = 1.09, 
p = .31, nor interaction, F(1,15) = 0.15, p = .70. Thus, for the subsequent analyses looking 
times to congruent and incongruent test events were collapsed across the test pairs. 
 
Figure 2. Average looking times to the test trials in Experiments 1 and 2. Error bars mark 
standard errors of means. Asterisk marks a statistically significant difference. Note that the 
raw looking times were log-transformed before parametric tests. 
 
In a series of 2x2 ANOVAs, no significant main effects or interactions with Test 
Events (Congruent vs. Incongruent) were found for the controlled factors: Order of Test 
Outcomes (Peeled-first vs. Healed-first) and Order of Test Events (Congruent-1st-and-4th vs. 
Congruent-2nd-and-3rd). There was a main effect of Function Assignment (Pink Peeler-Blue 
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Healer vs. Pink Healer-Blue Peeler), with the test trials looked at longer in case of the Pink 
Peeler-Blue Healer assignment, F(1,14) = 10.34, p = .006, !p2 = .42. However, there was no 
significant interaction between Function Assignment and Test Event either, F(1,14) = 0.19, p 
= .67. 
Planned comparisons using 2-tailed t-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
test confirmed that infants looked longer at the Incongruent than at the Congruent test events, 
t(15) = 2.65, p = .018, Cohen’s d = 0.66, Wilcoxon Z = -2.4, exact p = .014 (Figure 2). This 
pattern of looking-times was shown by 12 of the 16 babies. These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that human infants can readily learn mappings between novel tools and the 
goals that these tools help bringing about when employed in instrumental actions, even if the 
behavioral means by which these actions are performed are identical and the causal relations 
between the goal and the tool’s structure and manner of use are cognitively opaque. Some 
elements of the action-sequence were causally transparent to 13.5-months-old infants (e.g., 
transporting the tool from one location to another, covering and uncovering a banana, 
twisting the object around its axis and back), and could be evaluated as the most efficient 
means to the corresponding sub-goals. Since the causal relations between these means actions 
in the sequence and the end-state (e.g., a peeled banana) were cognitively opaque to the 
infants, their efficiency with respect to this stipulated goal could not be evaluated either as 
the most efficient or as violating efficiency. Consequently, causal opacity of the two novel 
tools did not prevent infants from interpreting the end-states as goals of the tool-using 
actions, and mapping them on the tools as their functions. 
In line with numerous recent reports on early goal-attribution (Biro, et al., 2011; 
Hernik & Southgate 2012; Luo, 2011; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005), the results demonstrate that 
the establishment of the mappings between visually perceivable tools and goal-states does not 
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require extensive habituation but can be induced by only 4 pairs of demonstrations in 13.5–
month-olds. 
Experiment 2 
The aim of this experiment was to test an alternative account of the results from 
Experiment 1. It is conceivable that the representations linking each tool with the respective 
final state of the banana were the results of mere visual association. Even much younger 
infants have been shown to extract statistical regularities from sequences of visual stimuli 
(Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002), and — as already pointed out in the introduction — 
according to some authors, statistical learning of the correlations between the tools and the 
states of environment co-occurring with their use (like outcomes) is one of the mechanisms 
of the early function acquisition (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011; Oakes & Madole, 2008; 
Madole & Cohen, 1995). 
In order to test whether infants in Experiment 1 formed the representations linking the 
two tools with the two states of the banana in virtue of their co-occurrence, in Experiment 2 
we provided infants with familiarization movies which differed from those used in 
Experiment 1 in just one respect: The final state of the banana in each movie was always 
identical to its initial state (i.e., an initially unpeeled banana remained unpeeled, and the 
peeled one remained peeled, when revealed from under the tool). Since for each child the 
correlation between each tool and the final state of the banana was exactly the same as in 
Experiment 1, the association account predicts that infants in Experiment 2 should be just as 
likely as those in Experiment 1 to map the final banana-states on the corresponding tools, and 
consequently would again display increased looking to test trials incongruent with such 
mappings. Arguably, Experiment 2 should provide even better conditions for visual 
associations than Experiment 1, since in each trial a given tool was ever operated in the visual 
proximity of only one banana-state (as opposed to two different states per each trial in 
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Experiment 1), and the time-window for forming a visual association between them was 
longer. 
Notably, this prediction is inconsistent with the teleo-functional account of infant tool 
understanding advocated in this paper. According to this account, infants in Experiment 1 
encoded the banana’s final state (peeled or unpeeled) in relation to the tool – at least in part – 
because they interpreted it as the goal of the respective instrumental action with the tool. An 
end-state of the action sequence, which is identical to the initial-state (before the action is 
commenced), is not likely to be interpreted by infants as the goal of that action, because the 
action cannot be readily interpreted as the most efficient way to achieve it. Thus, the teleo-
functional account predicts that the very same final states of the banana, which in Experiment 
1 had been encoded in relation to the respective tools, would be less likely to enter such 
mappings in Experiment 2, where they are poor candidates for action goals. 
Methods 
Participants. Sixteen 13.5-months-old infants (13 months and 0 days – 13 months 
and 25 days; mean = 13 months and 17 days) constituted the final sample. Four additional 
babies were excluded and replaced because of experimenter’s error, parental interference, 
looking at a test trial for less then 2 s, or fussiness resulting in not finishing the procedure. 
Procedure, stimuli and coding. The experimental and coding procedures, as well as 
the stimuli were identical to those of Experiment 1, except that in the familiarization movies 
the initial state of the banana (from the beginning of the movie, until the banana was covered 
with a tool) was always the same as its final state (since when the banana was revealed from 
under the tool, until the end of the movie). As in Experiment 1, 37% of test trials were 
double-coded, resulting in an excellent inter-coder agreement (r = .99, average absolute 
difference per trial = 110 ms). 
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Results and Discussion 
The overall level of infants’ attention to familiarization trials was almost identical to 
that of Experiment 1. On average, a familiarization trial was watched for 97% of its duration 
(minimum = 71%, maximum = 100%), with 82% of all familiarization trials watched for at 
least 95% of their duration. All infants looked towards the screen 100% of the time during the 
action phases of test trials. 
Mean looking times to the test trials are depicted on Figure 2. An initial 2 (Test Pair: 
1st vs. 2nd) x 2 (Test Event: Congruent vs. Incongruent) ANOVA on log-transformed 
looking-times showed no significant effects or interaction, all Fs(1,15) < .72, all ps > .41, 
thus for the subsequent analyses looking times to congruent and incongruent test events were 
collapsed across the test pairs. In a series of 2x2 ANOVAs, we found no significant main 
effects of, or interactions with Test Events (Congruent vs. Incongruent), for the controlled 
factors: Order of Test Outcomes (Peeled-first vs. Healed-first), Order of Test Events 
(Congruent-1st-and-4th vs. Congruent-2nd-and-3rd) and Function Assignment (Pink Peeler, 
Blue Healer vs. Pink Healer, Blue Peeler), all Fs(1,14) < 0.64, all ps > .44. 
Planned comparisons using 2-tailed t-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
test did not find significant differences in looking-times between Congruent and Incongruent 
test events, t(15) = 1.30, p = .21, Wilcoxon Z = -1.34, exact p = .19 (Figure 2). Only six of 
the 16 babies looked longer at the incongruent events and 10 showed the opposite pattern. 
A 2 (Test Events: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 2 (Experiment: 1 vs. 2) ANOVA 
found no significant main effects of either Test Events, F(1,30) = 0.003, p = .95, or 
Experiment, F(1,30) = 0.58, p = .45. Importantly, it did find a significant interaction, F(1,30) 
= 5.60, p = .024, !p2 = .16, suggesting that infants in Experiment 2 responded to the test 
events differently from those in Experiment 1. Specifically, unlike infants in Experiment 1, 
infants in Experiment 2 did not show longer looking to test events incongruent with the 
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pairings of tool and end-state presented in familiarization (Figure 2). These results suggest 
that the encoding of tools in relation to end-states in Experiment 1 cannot be accounted for by 
visual association. Moreover, they are consistent with the notion that interpreting the end-
state as the goal, towards which the action-sequence was the efficient means, was critical for 
forming the mappings observed in Experiment 1. 
It is worth pointing out that a recent study found that encoding of the end-state of an 
action sequence critically depended on efficiency in an age-group similar to that of our infant 
participants (Biro et al, 2011). Notably, similar to our experiments, Biro and colleagues 
(2001) used a fixed-length familiarization procedure, in which a human hand acted on a small 
set of objects. They showed 12-months-olds four familiarization trials in which a hand 
entered the stage, lifted the lid of a container and ended the action-sequence by grasping a 
toy. If opening the container during these familiarization events was efficiently related to the 
outcome of grasping the toy (because the toy was inside the container), infants showed 
evidence of encoding the identity of the toy involved in this end-state (i.e., they reacted with 
increased looking to the test event in which the hand grasped a new toy, rather than the old 
toy that it used to grasped during the familiarization). However, if during the familiarization 
the toy was always outside the container and thus lifting the lid was not efficiently related to 
the grasping outcome, then during test infants looked equally long at the hand grasping the 
old toy or the new one, thus showing no evidence of encoding the details of the outcome 
witnessed during the familiarization. In another condition reported by Biro and colleagues 
(2011), infants who watched the hand enter the stage and grasp the solitary toy (there was no 
container in this condition) also failed to evidence encoding the details of this outcome, and 
this result is consistent with numerous reports of null-effects in the so-called one-target 
versions of the Woodward paradigm (Hernik & Southgate 2012, Luo 2011, Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005). 
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The pattern of results reported by Biro et al. (2011) strongly suggests that even for 1-
year-olds encoding the details of action end-states may not be an easy feat but rather it 
depends on whether the end-states can be readily interpreted as action goals (see also, 
Woodward & Sommerville, 2000; Wynn, 2008). The success of our infant participants in 
forming tool-end-state mappings in Experiment 1 and the failure to evidence them in 
Experiment 2 is also consistent with this interpretation: the end-states, which could be 
interpreted as the goals of efficient actions, were encoded in relation to the respective tools, 
but those that could not be interpreted as goals – were not3. 
The remaining two experiments in the paper address the role of the communicative 
context in forming tool-goal mappings. 
Experiment 3 
In line with the theoretical proposal that communication facilitates the encoding of 
kind-relevant information (Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011), in Experiment 1 and 2, the 
instrumental actions with the novel tools were presented during familiarization in the context 
of communication directed to infant participants. Specifically, the audio track of the 
familiarization movies involved three sources of information (the prosody, the verbal content 
and the speaker), which could indicate to the infants that they were being communicatively 
addressed. 
                                                
3 Note that our manipulation prevented infants from interpreting the end-states of the action 
sequences as action goals (and our procedure tested specifically whether infants encoded 
these end-states in relation to the respective tools). This manipulation did not prevent infants 
from interpreting the no-change-of-state actions in Experiment 2 as directed at some other 
goals. The hypotheses tested in this paper do not specify what such goals could be and our 
task was not designed to test for such attributions. 
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In order to test whether infant-directed communication indeed supported formation of 
the tool-goal mappings in Experiment 1, we changed the audio track accompanying the 
familiarization movies by removing the three sources of information that infants in 
Experiment 1 might have relied on to infer ostensive communication directed to them. 
Specifically, instead of a familiar speaker addressing them in infant-directed speech, infants 
heard an unfamiliar speaker, who addressed some undetermined audience using adult-
directed intonation. We expected that infants exposed to such familiarization should be less 
likely to treat the instrumental actions with novel tools as communicative demonstrations, 
and consequently less likely to learn the end-states of the observed actions as the functions of 
the two novel tools. 
Methods 
Participants. Sixteen 13.5-months-old infants (13 months and 3 days – 13 months 
and 30 days; mean  =  13 months and 18 days) constituted the final sample. Ten additional 
babies were excluded and replaced because of equipment failure (1), parental interference 
(2), looking at a test trial for less then 2 s (3), indiscriminate looking at the screen for the full 
length of 2 test trials (1), or fussiness resulting in crying or not finishing the procedure (3). 
Procedure, stimuli and coding. The experimental and coding procedures, as well as 
the stimuli were identical to those of Experiment 1, except for the audio track that 
accompanied each familiarization movie. Specifically, the female voice was speaking with a 
“flat” prosody typical of adult-directed speech. She was saying in Hungarian “Good day, 
ladies and gentlemen. There is something here. Useful. Very well. Done.” The voice 
belonged to a lab-member with whom infants had no experience prior to testing. As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, 37% of test trials were double-coded, resulting in an excellent inter-
coder agreement (r  =  .99, average absolute difference per trial  =  80 ms). 
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Results and Discussion 
As in Experiments 1 & 2, attention to familiarization events was at ceiling level. On 
average a familiarization trial was watched for 98% of its duration (minimum = 62%, 
maximum = 100%), with an excellent 91% of all familiarization trials watched for at least 
95% of their duration. All infants looked towards the screen 100% of the time during the 
action phases of test trials. 
 
Figure 3. Looking times to test trials in Experiment 3. Error bars mark standard errors of 
means. Asterisk marks a statistically significant difference. Note that the raw looking times 
were log-transformed before parametric tests. 
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An initial 2 (Test Pair: 1st vs. 2nd) x 2 (Test Event: Congruent vs. Incongruent) 
ANOVA on log-transformed looking-times to test-event outcomes showed no significant 
effects of Test Pair, F(1,15)  =  2.86, p  =  .11, or Test Event, F(1,15) = 0.95, p = .35, but it 
did show a significant interaction between the two, F(1,15) = 7.27, p = .017, !p2 = .33. The 
significant interaction was further investigated using 2-tailed t-tests and Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks tests, which revealed that infants looked significantly longer at the Incongruent Event 
than at the Congruent Event during the first test pair, t(15) = 2.33, p = .034, Cohen’s d = 0.58, 
Wilcoxon Z = -2.28, exact p = .021, whereas during the second test pair they tended to look 
longer at the Congruent Event, even though this difference was not statistically significant, 
t(15) = 2.10, p = .052, Cohen’s d = 0.53, Wilcoxon Z = -1.76, exact p = .08 (Figure 3). 
During the first test pair 12 of the 16 babies looked longer at the Incongruent Event, but 
during the second test pair only five did, Fisher’s exact p = .032. 
There were no significant effect of Order of Test Outcomes (Peeled-first vs. Healed-
first) and Function Assignment (Pink Peeler-Blue Healer vs. Pink Healer-Blue Peeler), nor 
interactions of each of these factors with Test Event nor Test Pair, all Fs(1,14) < 0.67, all ps 
> .43. There was no significant interaction between the Test Event and Order of Test Events 
in the first pair of test trials, F(1,14) = 2.10, p = .17, but there was one in the 2nd pair, F(1,14) 
= 5.90, p = .029, !p2 = .30, which further suggests that, unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, in 
Experiment 3 infants’ processing of the test events differed between the two test pairs4. 
                                                
4 The interaction was due to the fact that infants looked at the Congruent Event in the 2nd pair 
longer than the Incongruent Event only when it was presented first, t(7) = 4.53, p = .003, 
Cohen’s d = 1.6, Wilcoxon Z = -2.52, p = .008, 2-tailed, but not when it was presented 
second, t(7) = 0.003, p = .99, Wilcoxon Z = -0.42, p = .74. These post hoc effects are difficult 
to interpret due to a very small sample size. 
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 A 2 (Experiment: 1 vs. 3) x 2 (Test Event: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 2 (Test Pair: 
1st vs. 2nd) ANOVA showed a significant effect of Test Event, F(1,30) = 6.30, p = .018, !p2 = 
.17, as well as a significant three-way interaction, F(1,30) = 4.50, p = .042, !p2 = .13. No 
other effects or interactions were significant. In response to the comment by an anonymous 
reviewer, we also analyzed infants’ looking to the first pair of test events across Experiments 
1 and 3, in order to test whether the non-ostensive presentation in Experiment 3 might have 
facilitated the tool-goal mappings. Such result would not be predicted by our account. In a 2 
(Experiment: 1 vs. 3) x 2 (Test Event: Congruent vs. Incongruent) ANOVA, we found only a 
significant main effect of Test Event, F(1,30) = 5.86, p = .022, !p2 = .16, but no effect of 
Experiment an no interaction (ps > .32). Thus, in infants’ looking to the first pair of test 
events, we found no evidence to suggest facilitation of tool-function mappings by the non-
ostensive context. 
Altogether, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that removing possible indicators of 
ostensive infant-directed communication had a subtle, yet telling, effect on infants’ learning 
of novel tool functions. On the one hand, infants who watched the instrumental actions, 
which were not ostensively demonstrated to them, nevertheless encoded the goal-outcomes 
achieved with the two novel tools, and consequently reacted with increased looking to the test 
trials incongruent with these mappings. On the other hand, this evidence of learning new tool 
functions was short-lived and restricted solely to the first pair of test events. This pattern of 
looking-behavior across the test-pairs — significantly different from that of infants in 
Experiment 1 — suggests that the tool representations which infants acquired by watching 
non-ostensively presented instrumental actions with these tools were different from those 
acquired by watching ostensive infant-directed demonstrations. 
Notably, representations acquired in the non-ostensive context failed to support 
infants’ expectations after the first test-pair, i.e., after the first counterevidence to the newly 
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acquired tool-function mappings was encountered by observing the first incongruent test trial. 
Recently, in a study on inductive inference and exploratory behavior in 4-year-olds, Butler 
and Markman (2012) reported a similar “vulnerability” to counterevidence when functional 
information about novel artifacts was acquired from non-ostensive action presentations. A 
different exploration-pattern, suggestive of a relative “resilience” to counterevidence, was 
observed in preschoolers for whom the very same functional property was demonstrated 
communicatively. According to Butler and Markman (2012), resilience in the face of 
mounting negative evidence is a signature characteristic of generic encoding, where 
information extracted from a communicative demonstration, which employs particulars, is 
attributed not just to those particulars themselves but also to the representation of the kind to 
which they belong. 
One aspect of generic encoding is that it is readily expected to be relevant beyond the 
current demonstration and generalizable to new contexts, new instances and new items of the 
same kind. Another aspect is that it is not readily falsified by counterexamples (Leslie, 2007). 
Gergely & Jacob (2012) argued that similar “resilience” patterns are found in infants learning 
a novel means-action (Gergely, Bekkering & Király 2002; Király, Csibra & Gergely, 2013) 
or a hiding location of a target-object (Topál, Gergely, Miklósi, Erd"hegyi, & Csibra, 2008; 
Topál, Gergely, Erd"hegyi, Csibra, & Miklósi, 2009) from ostensive communicative 
demonstrations. Consistent with these interpretations, the significant difference in the 
resilience of infants' expectations between the current Experiments 1 and 3 may also reflect a 
difference between generic vs. non-generic encoding of the novel tools' functions. It suggests 
that only functions presented to the babies through communicative demonstrations might 
have been represented as enduring tool properties (Experiment 1), not just as idiosyncratic 
transient properties manifested in a particular demonstration episode (Experiment 3). 
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Experiment 4 
The aim of Experiment 4 was to test directly the prediction — stemming from the 
post-hoc interpretation of the results of Experiment 3 — that infants’ representations of novel 
tool functions can be resilient or vulnerable to counterevidence depending on whether they 
were acquired from infant-directed communicative demonstrations or not. In Experiment 4 
infants first watched familiarization events with the banana-peeler and the banana-healer, 
which were presented in the context of either infant-directed, or adult-directed 
communication (just like in the familiarizations of Experiments 1 and 3, respectively). But 
this time, before their representations were assessed at test, infants were confronted with 
counterevidence to the tool-goal mappings, which they had been exposed to during 
familiarization. On a single trial just before the test, one of the tools produced the outcome 
opposite to what it had produced during familiarization (e.g., the banana-peeler was shown to 
heal the banana, or the banana-healer was shown to peel the banana). 
We expected that the infants who were exposed to infant-directed ostensive 
demonstrations would maintain clear expectations about tool-goal correspondences, as their 
generic representations of the two tools and their enduring functions should remain 
unchallenged by the single counterexample. Consequently, they should react with longer 
looking to test trials in which these mapping were violated, like infants in Experiment 1 did. 
On the other hand, if infants who acquired their tool-outcome mappings from the 
familiarization without infant-directed communication encoded them as transient 
idiosyncratic episodes, they should show a significantly different looking-pattern at test. In 
fact, since in Experiment 4 the counter-example preceded the test trials, these infants may not 
show at test any clear expectations about the tool-goal correspondences at all, similar to the 
infants in Experiment 3, who failed to show them after the exposure to counterevidence in the 
initial test trials. 
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Methods 
Participants. Thirty two 13.5-months-old infants constituted the final sample divided 
into two conditions: infant-directed ostension (13 months and 9 days – 13 months and 30 
days; mean  =  13 months and 20 days) and no infant-directed ostension (13 months and 0 
days – 13 months and 29 days; mean  =  13 months and 14 days). Fifteen additional babies 
were excluded and replaced because of parent’s interference (1), experimenter’s error (2), 
looking to an outcome phase for less than 2 seconds (4), looking away during the action 
phase of the test (3), fussiness resulting in crying or not finishing the procedure (4) and 
coding difficulties (1). 
Procedure, stimuli and coding. The experimental and coding procedures, as well as 
the stimuli the infant-directed ostension and no infant-directed ostension conditions were 
identical to those of Experiments 1 and 3 respectively, except that there was a single 
additional familiarization trial (counterevidence trial) presented between the familiarization 
and test, preceded by the attention-getting animation (a black-and-white checkerboard 
shaking periodically at the center of the screen while a gentle bell-sound was emitted). The 
counter-evidence trial showed the tools in the same spatial arrangement as the 8th 
familiarization trial and the 1st test trial. The tool used on that trial always produced the 
outcome opposite to what it used to produce during the preceding familiarization trials. For 
half of the babies the counterevidence trial showed the use of the same tool that was used in 
the last familiarization trial, for the other half it showed the other tool. The counterevidence 
trial was silent. As in earlier experiments, 37% of test trials were double-coded, resulting in 
an excellent inter-coder agreement (r  =  .99, average absolute difference per trial  =  103 ms). 
Results and Discussion 
Overt attention to familiarization events and to the counter-evidence trials was at 
ceiling level. On average a familiarization trial was watched for 97% of its duration 
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(minimum = 31%, maximum = 100%), with 71% of all familiarization trials watched for at 
least 95% of their duration. The counterevidence trial was attended on average for 97% of its 
duration with 78% of trials watched for at least 95% of their duration. There was no 
significant difference in how much overt attention infants in the two conditions paid to the 
familiarization events (UMann-Whitney = 113.5, p = .58) and to the counter-evidence trial (UMann-
Whitney = 117, p = .53). All infants in the final sample looked towards the screen 100% of the 
time during the action phases of test trials. 
 
Figure 4. Looking times to test trials in Experiment 4. Error bars mark standard errors of 
means. Asterisk marks a statistically significant difference. Note that the raw looking times 
were log-transformed before parametric tests. 
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An initial 2 (Test Pair: 1st vs. 2nd) x 2 (Test Event: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 2 
(Condition: Ostension vs. No-ostension) ANOVA on log-transformed looking-times to test-
event outcomes showed no significant effect of Test Pair, F(1,30) = 2.50. p = .12, or any 
significant interactions between Test Pair and other factors (highest F(1,30) = 1.58, p = .22), 
therefore for further analyses the data were averaged across the test pairs. In a series of 
ANOVAs, no interactions with Test Event were found for the remaining controlled factors: 
Order of Test Outcomes (Peeled-first vs. Healed-first) and Function Assignment (Pink 
Peeler-Blue Healer vs. Pink Healer-Blue Peeler). 
In a 2 (Test Event: Congruent vs. Incongruent) x 2 (Condition: Ostension vs. No-
ostension) ANOVA we found a marginally significant effect of Condition (infants in the No-
ostension group tended to look longer), F(1,30) = 3.72, p = .063, !p2 = .11, and a significant 
interaction, F(1,30) = 6.49, p = .016, !p2 = .18. Comparison of the individual patterns of 
looking confirmed that infants across the two conditions reacted to the test events differently 
(Figure 4). While 11 out of 16 babies in the Ostension condition looked longer at the 
incongruent rather than the congruent test trials, in the No-ostension condition only 4 out of 
the 16 babies did, Fisher’s exact p = .032, 2-tailed. 
Planned pairwise contrasts showed that in the Ostension condition babies looked 
significantly longer at the incongruent rather then the congruent test events, F(1,30) = 4.52, p 
= .042, !p2 = .13, whereas in the No-ostension condition they looked longer at the congruent 
events, however, this tendency was not statistically significant, F(1,30) = 2.18, p = .15. 
Comparisons using non-parametric Wilcoxon tests on looking times showed a smiliar pattern, 
but the effect in the Ostension condition did not reach statistical significance, Ostension: 
ZWilcoxon = -1.7, p = .093; No-ostension: ZWilcoxon = 1.03, p = .32. These results replicate the 
findings of Experiments 1 and 3 and allow us to conclude that infant-directed ostension 
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facilitated the encoding of the tool-goal mappings as enduring aspects of tool representation. 
Resilience to counterevidence suggests that these mappings had a format of generic, rather 
than episodic representations, which could provide the basis for ascribing kind-defining 
functions to the novel tools. 
General Discussion 
The capacity for goal attribution is a remarkable, well documented feature of action 
understanding in infancy, often thought to be a cornerstone of early social cognition (Gergely 
& Csibra, 2003; Luo, 2011; Woodward 1998), which may support acquisition of tool 
functions (Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Hernik & Csibra, 2009). 
Sensitivity to ostensive communication is another hallmark of human infancy (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2006), which recently has been proposed to support social transfer of generic 
knowledge about kinds (Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011). The results of our experiments 
suggest that infants may indeed rely on the mechanisms of goal-attribution to start encoding 
functions of tools and that when such representations are acquired in a communicative 
context, the functions can be encoded as enduring generic tool properties. 
Our findings indicate that at the beginning of the second year of life human infants 
readily represent novel objects in relation to the end-states of actions in which these objects 
are employed (Experiments 1, 3 & 4). Notably, several aspects of these findings are 
consistent with the proposal that the underlying mechanism is guided by teleological action 
interpretation. Specifically, (i) in line with the findings that infants attend specifically to the 
end-states over the spatiotemporal characteristics of the means actions (Woodward, 1998), in 
our experiment participants formed separate tool-end-state mappings despite the two means 
actions were identical. (ii) In line with numerous empirical findings documenting that infants’ 
encoding of the end-states of action-sequences as goals critically depends on whether the 
actions can be readily interpreted as efficient means to the end-states (Biro et al. 2011; 
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Hernik & Southgate, 2012), the results of Experiment 2 confirmed that the tool-end-state 
mappings indeed depended on whether the actions with the tools could be interpreted as 
efficient ways of bringing out the end-states. (iii) In line with recent reports of early goal-
attribution (Biro, et al., 2011; Hernik & Southgate 2012; Luo 2011; Luo & Baillargeon 
2005), in our experiment infants formed representations of action end-states on the bases of 
relatively few examples. (iv) In line with the proposal that by inferring what the tool is for 
(the function) from what it is used for (the action goal) infants may overcome a challenge of 
acquiring functional tool knowledge despite the physical opacity of tools (Csibra & Gergely, 
2007), our infant participants attributed functions to tools despite the lack of knowledge of 
how the different end-states are causally related to the physical attributes of the novel tools 
and to the manners of use. 
Our results also add to a growing body of evidence supporting the proposal that 
communication contributes to vertical social transmission of generic knowledge, at the 
receptive end of which human infants are prepared to be from early on in ontogeny (Futó et 
al., 2010; Király et al. 2013; Egyed, Király & Gergely, 2013; Yoon et al. 2008, Topál et al., 
2008, 2009; Senju & Csibra; 2008; Butler & Markman, 2012). Infants' tool-function 
mappings acquired from communicative demonstrations (Experiments 1 and 4) exhibited 
endurance in the face of counterevidence, which was lacking if the mappings were acquired 
from demonstrations that were not infant-directed (Experiments 3 and 4). At the same time, 
the null-results of Experiment 2 are consistent with recent findings that suggest that 
acquisition of the opaque arbitrary means communicated to infants is constrained by their 
pre-existing expectations about what constitutes a well formed goal-directed action (Király et 
al., 2013). When end-state of the observed novel arbitrary action with a tool was identical to 
the state of the environment prior to the action (and thus could not be interpreted as the action 
goal), infants are not likely to imitate the action (Király et al., 2013), or show evidence of a 
32 
LEARNING TOOL FUNCTIONS FROM ACTION DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
mapping between the tool and the end-state (current Experiment 2), even if the action was 
presented in an ostensive communicative context. 
Tools constitute an extensive domain in the proximal environment of a human child. 
Learning about tools requires the coordination of several learning mechanisms, and 
contribution from various (physical, motor, social) domains of cognition. The aim of our 
studies was to test the predictions derived from the hypotheses, according to which goal 
attribution supports function acquisition and sensitivity to communication supports 
representation of enduring functions in infancy. Our studies found positive evidence for such 
generic teleo-functional understanding of tools in 13-months-old infants. It remains an open 
question whether successfully formed toy-sound mappings, found in slightly younger babies 
using a habituation-switch paradigm (Baumgartner & Oakes, 2011), should be accounted for 
by the same mechanism, or they result from general statistical learning mechanisms that do 
not appeal to the notion of  ‘goal’. It is also an open question whether and how association-
based mechanisms may interact with teleological interpretation mechanisms in supporting the 
acquisition of tool-knowledge. Further research may elucidate the relations between forming 
the tool-goal mapping and encoding particular means-action that bring the goal about with 
the help of the tool, as well as the role that contrasting the two end-states on alternate trials 
might have had in forming the tool-goal mappings in the current studies. Convergent 
evidence for the role of communicative goal-directed demonstrations in forming such 
mappings is also needed, especially if it relies on experimental manipulations of goal-
directedness and ostension different from those employed in the current experiments. Since 
both the capacity for goal attribution and the sensitivity to ostensive communicative signals 
are available to infants much earlier in their first year of life (Csibra, 2008; Luo 2011; Csibra 
& Gergely, 2006), future studies should investigate the age at which the development of 
generic tool knowledge starts being effectively supported by functional understanding. 
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